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1 Introduction
The last two decades have been marked by a growing concern about rising in-
equality. In a recent book (2012), Joseph Stiglitz, a former Nobel prize winner
in Economics argues that rising income inequality is one of the main factors un-
derlying the economic and financial crisis in the United States. In its 13th-19th
October 2012, the Economist, a magazine, has devoted a special report on income
inequality in the world.
Media interest has surrounded the emergence of the inequality debate in pub-
lic arenas and square. Protesters in the United States (the Occupy Wall Street
movement) and in Spain (the indignados) have denounced the present system
as fundamentally flawed and unfair. A rally cry of these movement is that
bankers benefiting from large bonuses have been bailed out while the victims
of the crisis brought by the very same bankers are stuck in unemployment. The
We are the 99% slogan and the associated web blog “We are the 99 percent” (see
http://wearethe99percent.tumblr.com/) also refer to this growing unequal
distribution of wealth.
On a broader perspective the issue about the benefits (or otherwise) of redistribu-
tive policies is at the heart of the presidential election debate Kerry versus Obama
in the US at the time of writing the present report. Nobel prize economist and
polemist Paul Krugmann in his blog ( http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/)
denounces the anti-Keynesian stance and policies of his adversaries. In this de-
bate all is up for discussion, from the interpretation of the Great Depression and
the New Deal to the economic success of Latvia in fighting the present crisis, with
the issue of inequality squarely at the centre-stage.
The development of income inequality in the EU Member States has been the
subject of a recent publication by the OECD (2011). The report highlights a
general trend of widening income disparities. While in the 1980s the Gini coef-
ficient was equal to around 0.29 in OECD countries it markedly rose to 0.32 in
the late 2000s. Particularly striking is the increase in income inequality of former
equal societies, such as the Nordic countries and Germany. The causes of this ris-
ing income inequality in the past decades have also attracted much political and
scholarly attention. The OECDs (2011) report provides a wealth of explanatory
mechanisms, ranging from rising wage inequality to different taxation policies and
household structures.
A different perspective is to look at the social and economic challenges associ-
ated with rising income inequalities in the EU, i.e. to ask whether and why we
should pay attention to the growing polarization between the 1% and the 99%
of the population? These questions gained prominence through a widely cited
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book by Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett entitled “The Spirit Level, Why
More Equal Societies Almost Always Do Better” (2009). Although the authors
main tenet that more equal societies perform better on a wide range of social
outcomes is intuitive and straightforward, the authors do not provide convincing
empirical evidence for their propositions and the lack of a causal link between
inequality and the many social outcomes analyzed in the book has been the
subject of a heated debate, see e.g. the authors own blog for a list of refuta-
tions and counter-refutations http://www.equalitytrust.org.uk/resources/
response-to-questions.
The book of Wilkinson and Pickett has been instrumental in promoting a cooper-
ation between the Directorate General Joint Research Centre (DG JRC) and the
Directorate General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (DG EMPL)
on the social and economic challenges associated with the rising income inequality
in Europe.
The cooperation aims at analyzing the socio-consequences of rising income in-
equalities in Europe. The present report is the second outcome of this project,
the first being a literature review (EUR No. pending) on the relationship be-
tween income inequality and social outcome variables in the area of happiness,
criminality, health, social capital, education, voting behavior and female labor
participation. 1. In the present report, we complement the literature review by
examining the bivariate correlations existing between income inequality and some
of the social outcomes mentioned above.
The present analysis is carried out at the sub-national level (NUTS1 level) and
focuses on bivariate correlations. In a next report, a multivariate analysis will be
performed for a reduced number of social outcomes. In this last report we shall
attempt to establish a clear direction of causality. The chosen social outcomes
are political participation and crime.
This present report is organized as follows. Section 2 addresses a number of data
and methodological issues. In particular, we tackle (i) the regional dimension
of the analysis, (ii) the measures employed for income inequality, and (iii) the
data sources used for income and the social outcomes. In addition, we provide
information on the empirical methods used for the analysis as well as the ro-
bustness checks. Section 3 constitutes the main part of this work and starts by
presenting an overview over the income inequality observed on NUTS1 level in
Europe. The following subsections discuss then the regional distribution of social
outcomes over Europe and presents the bivariate correlations between the income
inequality measures and the social outcomes as well as the associated ordinary
least squares coefficients.
1Report delivered by JRC to DG EMPL in May 2012
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As already noted in the literature review, the correlations presented in this re-
port confirm the negative relationship between income inequality and some social
outcomes. More precisely, we find that higher income inequality is significantly
related to lower recorded voter turnout, lower participation in voluntary organi-
zations, higher crime rates and higher early school leaver rates. Results remain
valid, irrespective of the estimator or the income disparity index employed. Trust
and self-reported voting behaviors are also negatively and significantly associated
with income inequality, though the findings are found to be sensitive to the esti-
mation method or the inequality index used for the computation of the bivariate
statistics. Finally, the social outcomes related to well-being and health are not
found to be significantly associated with income disparities.
As the empirical analysis below is only based on bivariate statistics, the results
should be taken with a pinch of salt as none of the statistical associations discussed
in this paper can be regarded as evidence of a causal relationship, which will be
the subject of our next effort.
2 Methodological and data issues
2.1 Sub national level of analysis
The empirical analysis is carried out at the sub-national level.2 To that end, we
have used the regional classification developed by Eurostat in the 1970s, i.e., the
Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS), which provides a single
and uniform geographical division of the European Union into a hierarchical set
of regions. The NUTS classification subdivides the economic territory of the
Member States into three levels: NUTS1, NUTS2 and NUTS3. NUTS3 are
subdivisions of NUTS2 which are themselves sub-divisions of NUTS1.3 NUTS1
represents major socioeconomic regions, NUTS2 captures basic regions used for
the implementation of regional policies while NUTS3 relates to smaller areas.4
While the NUTS Regulation has defined minimum and maximum population
thresholds for the average size of the NUTS1-3 regions as shown in Table 1, the
NUTS classification is also related to administrative subdivisions already existing
in Member States.
2This is an explicit requirement of the technical annex describing this cooperation AA-JRC
N.32376-2011 NFP
3Note that two lower levels of Local Administrative Units (LAU) have also been defined:
the upper LAU level (LAU level 1, formerly NUTS level 4) and the lower LAU level (formerly
NUTS level 5).
4The NUTS classification has acquired a legal status relatively recently, after the adoption
of a Regulation in May 2003. Previously, the use and update of the NUTS classification was
done under “gentlemen’s agreements” between the Member States and Eurostat.
Income inequality and social outcomes 7
Table 1: NUTS classification: population thresholds.
Min Population Max Population
NUTS 1 3 000 000 7 000 000
NUTS 2 800 000 3 000 000
NUTS 3 150 000 800 000
Source: Regions in the European Union Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics
(2010).
For instance, NUTS2 and 3 respectively correspond to the regions and depart-
ments in France and to Comunidades auto´nomas and provincias in Spain. Simi-
larly, NUTS1 and NUT3 are the La¨nder and Kreise in Germany. Table 2 reports
the number of NUTS1-3 regions for each EU Member States.5 The current NUTS
classification valid since the first January 2012 divides the 27 EU countries into
97 regions at NUTS 1, 271 regions at NUTS 2 and 1303 regions at NUTS 3 level.6
The compilation of regional statistics raises specific issues, particularly when
regional indicators are derived from micro surveys nationally representative.
Whilst, an analysis of the correlation between income inequality and several social
outcomes would be finer at the NUTS3 level than at the NUTS1 level, analysis
on the NUTS3 level are not very reliable due to low number of observations per
NUTS3 region. This is particularly true in the present report as most of the
social outcomes are drawn from cross-country surveys with limited sample sizes.
For this reason, the empirical analysis reported in this report has been conducted
at the NUTS1 level.
2.2 Income inequality indices
The two main indicators of income inequality used for the analysis are (i) the
ratio of the income received by the richest 20% households to the income held
by the 20% poorest households (S80/S20 ratio) and (ii) the Gini coefficient. The
sections below briefly introduce these two inequality measures.
2.2.1 The S80/S20 Ratio
The S80/S20 ratio can be expressed as follows :
5Since 2003, the NUTS regulation has been amended several times to reflect the introduction
of the regions of the 10 new Member States in 2004 and of the regions of Bulgaria and Romania
in 2007.
6In this document, we shall consider the NUTS classification that had been used in the
previous period (2006 NUTS classification), given that all the data used for the computation of
bivariate statistics refer to the period between 2005 and 2010. The number of NUTS1 remains
unchanged.
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Table 2: Number of NUTS1, NUTS2 and NUTS3 by country.
Country NUTS 1 NUTS 2 NUTS 3
AT 3 9 35
BE 3 11 44
BG 2 6 28
CZ 1 8 14
DK 1 5 11
DE 16 39 429
EE 1 1 4
IE 1 2 8
GR 4 13 51
ES 7 19 59
FR 9 26 100
IT 5 21 107
CY 1 1 1
LV 1 1 6
LT 1 1 10
LU 1 1 1
HU 3 7 20
MT 1 1 2
NL 4 12 40
PL 6 16 66
PT 3 7 30
RO 4 8 42
SI 1 2 12
SK 1 4 8
FI 2 5 20
SE 3 8 21
UK 12 37 133
EU-27 97 271 1303
Source: Regions in the European Union Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics
(2010). If the number of individuals living in a Member State is below the minimum thresh-
old for a given NUTS level, the Member State itself constitutes a NUTS territorial unit of
that level. There are 11 countries (CZ, DK, EE, IE, CY, LV, LT, LU, MT, SI, SK) for which
NUTS0 and NUTS1 coincide.
S80
S20
=
∑
i|yi≥Q80 yi∑
i|yi≤Q20 yi
(1)
where Q80 and Q20 represent the 80th and the 20th percentile respectively. The
S80
S20
ratio allows for a crude perception of a society’s degree of polarization. If
S80/S20 is equal to x, it implies that the income of the richest 20% of the pop-
ulation is higher by a factor of x than the income of the poorest 20%. The S80
S20
ratio is an appealing measure of disparity as it is both easily understandable and
represents an effective way to measure the distance between the extremes of a
distribution. However, by its very nature, the S80
S20
ratio ignores information on
income and income dispersion between the 20th and the 80th percentiles, which
constitutes the majority of the population under consideration. The presence
of extreme income values, belonging to either the upper tail or the lower tail
of the income distribution, could produce high value of S80
S20
ratio, even if the
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interquantile range 80/20 is fairly equitable.7
2.2.2 The Gini coefficient
The Gini coefficient has been the most popular method for operationalizing in-
come inequality in literature. The Gini coefficient is defined on the basis of the
Lorenz curve. The Lorenz curve maps the cumulative income share on the y-axis
against the cumulative population share ordered from the lowest income to the
highest one on the x-axis as seen below:
Figure 1: Lorenz curve.
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0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
Lorenz curve Line of perfect equality
Source: Authors’ calculations on 2009 EU-SILC data.
In case of perfect equality in the distribution of education, the Lorenz curve and
the diagonal coincide. The larger the distance of the curve from the diagonal line,
the larger the inequality. When for two countries, x and y, the Lorenz curve of
country x lies in any point above the Lorenz curve of country y, income disparities
7Note that this indicator satisfies few of the statistical desirable qualities (i.e., symmetry,
scale invariance, Pigou-Dalton transfer and decomposability properties (see Cowell (2009) for
additional information) of inequality indices. In particular, this statistic does not satisfy the
Pigou-Dalton transfer principle, i.e, a transfer of income from a rich household to a poor one in
the interquantile range 80/20 does not result in a more equal income distribution as measured
by the S80S20 ratio.
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in country y are higher than in country x.8
The Gini coefficient summarizes the whole income distribution and corresponds
to the ratio of the area between the diagonal and the Lorenz Curve (A) and
the total area under the diagonal (A+B). The coefficient ranges from 0 (perfect
equality) to 1 which represents the case in which all income is owned by one
individual (perfect inequality).
The Gini coefficient can also be expressed as a function of all inter-household
income differences taken in absolute value, normalized around the mean income.
More precisely, the Gini coefficient can be computed using the following formula:
GINI =
1
2n(n− 1)μ
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
|yi − yj| (2)
with yi defined as the income level of an household i, n the number of households
and μ the average income. The Gini coefficient ranges between 0 and 1. When
each household has an income equal to μ, then the Gini coefficient is 0. Similarly,
if one recipient receives an income amounting to n ∗ μ, while the rest of the
population has no income, the Gini coefficient takes the value 1. As n increases,
the computation of (1) can be cumbersome. However, as shown by Deaton (1997),
insofar as we can rank the n units from the richest (ri = 1) to the poorest (ri = n),
the Gini coefficient can be computed as follows:
Gini =
n+ 1
n− 1 −
2
n(n− 1)μ
n∑
i=1
riyi (3)
In contrast to the S80/S20 ratio, the Gini is a synthetic measure of income in-
equality which describes the overall inequality across all the income distribution.
This inequality metric is bounded between 0 and 1 and satisfies the Pigou-Dalton
transfer principle, i.e., a transfer of income from a rich household to a poor one
results in a more equal income distribution. Indeed as shown by the formula
above, the Gini coefficient gives more weight to poorer households in the income
distribution than to richer ones.9
The Gini is also relatively insensitive to the tails of the distribution and thus
8If the two Lorenz curves cross each other, then we cannot conclude which distribution is
more equitable using only the information given by the shape of the 2 Lorenz curves.
9The Gini coefficient satisfies most of the desirable statistical properties. In particular, this
income inequality measure is independent of the population size, scale invariant and satisfies
Pigou-Dalton’s Principle of Transfers (Dalton, 1920). It can be used to compare income in-
equality across different countries as it is independent of the unit of measurement. Inequality
is often decomposed by population groups to measure the contribution of the within country
and between country effects to the total income inequality. However the Gini coefficient cannot
be easily decomposed into between and within-country groups or to be added across groups to
show the sources of inequality.
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relatively robust to problems associated with reliability of extreme values, its
value being more sensitive to changes around the mode than to variations in
the extremes of the income distribution. However, the interpretation of the Gini
coefficient is not as straightforward as for the S80/S20 ratio. Indeed, although
the level of inequality is given by the value of the coefficient, its interpretation
can only be done in comparative terms.
2.3 Income data
2.3.1 Income definition
One of the first steps in calculating income inequality is to decide about which
income measure to use. An appropriate income measure should reflect the net
financial means available to an individual. Most commonly used is the concept
of total disposable household income (OECD, 2011; Eurostat, 2010). This is the
aggregate income that we employ in this analysis.
Total disposable household income includes all income accruing to the household,
e.g. gross employee income, income (also losses) from self-employment, income
from rental of property etc., plus benefits received by the state, such as unem-
ployment benefits, housing allowances, pensions, and subtracts taxes and social
insurance contributions paid (Eurostat, 2010). Thereby, this measure reflects the
financial means available to the household for consumption.
The next step in the calculation of an income inequality measure is to distribute
the household income to all individuals living in the household. To satisfy the
consumption of an additional household member additional income is needed,
albeit income needs only to increase at a decreasing rate. To illustrate this,
adding another person to a one-person household is likely not to double energy
consumption. To reflect these economies of scale the total household income is
divided by an equivalence scale. The equivalence scale used in this report is the
modified OECD scale and has the following weights: The first adult, i.e. person
age 14 or older, in the household weights 1, all following adults are assigned a
weight of 0.5, and children weight 0.3 (Eurostat, 2012). For example for a two
adult family with three children aged 10, 12, and 15, the equivalence scale would
be: 1 + 0.5 + 0.5 + 0.3 + 0.3 = 2.6. Hence, the total disposable household
income would be divided by 2.6 and the value of the equivalised income would
then be artificially assigned to all household members.
While there seems to be a consensus that disposable income is an adequate mea-
sure of economic well-being it should be noted that it is not clear whether to
include other benefits accruing to households in the income measure. In particu-
lar there is an ongoing debate whether and how to include the so-called “imputed
Income inequality and social outcomes 12
rents” in the income measure. The argument is that households, who either
own their apartment or house and thus do not pay rent, or households, who pay
rents which are substantially below the market value, need to spend less income
for housing costs and thus have more income available for other consumption.
According to Eurostat (2010, chapter 7) including imputed rent in the income
increases the mean income and decreases income inequality in almost all countries
(exceptions are the Netherlands and Norway). However, the ranking of countries
remain unchanged when imputed rent is included (see Frick et al., 2008).10
In addition to imputed rent, it is also noteworthy that own consumption, i.e.
consumption of goods that are produced by oneself is not included in income
and this might understate the actual income of households in certain regions
(Eurostat, 2010, p.180). However, so far, there is no comparable and reliable
information of own consumption to be included in the disposable income measure.
Given the limited data availability and conceptual problems of imputed rent and
own consumption, the total disposable household income used in the current
analysis does not include imputed rents and own consumption.
2.3.2 Data sources
For most countries information on disposable income is drawn from the 2005-2009
waves of the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (hence-
forth EU-SILC). The EU-SILC is an annual household survey aiming at collecting
comparable cross-sectional and longitudinal micro-data on income, poverty, so-
cial exclusion and other living conditions. This is the main source of information
about living standard and poverty in the Member States of the European Union.11
EU-SILC was launched in 2004 as a replacement of the European Household Panel
Survey. The first release of data (relating to the year 2004) included data for 13
Member States (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, Sweden), plus Norway and Iceland.
From 2005, Germany, Netherlands and the UK joined, along with the rest of
the new Member States (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia). Finally, from 2007 onwards, the EU-SILC represents
all 27 Member States, and includes Turkey and Switzerland as non-members
alongside Norway and Iceland.12 Also, very important in the context of this
10There are also a number of methodological and data related issues when estimating imputed
rent. In particular, rents could be imputed by relying on the capital market or on self-estimation.
Depending on which method is used, values for imputed rents differ substantially and they might
not be comparable across countries (see Eurostat, 2010).
11See http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/microdata/eu_silc
for further information.
12As EU-SILC is a harmonised data framework involving ex ante standardisation (in contrast
to the European Community Household Panel, ECHP, survey), data from all countries are not
collected via a single standard survey instrument. Instead, Member States are given a list of
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work, the data includes for the majority of countries information on the region
of residence of households allowing us to construct regional indices of income in-
equality. This is true for all countries, but UK, the Netherlands, Germany and
Portugal; for these 4 countries, the region of residence is not reported.
We have been unable to find surveys on living conditions for Portugal and the
Netherlands with information on the region of residence. For the Netherlands,
income inequality indices will thus be measured at the country level, whereas for
Portugal they will be calculated by using income data pertaining to the mainland
region PT1. Note that for Portugal we exclude the regions of the archipelago of
the Azores and Madeira, which represent less than 5% of the total population.
Lastly, we excluded from our sample the French overseas regions (Guadeloupe,
Martinique, Guyane, Reunion) because of lack on information on the social out-
come variables.
For Germany and the UK, we have respectively employed the 2004-2009 waves
of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) and the version 2009/2010 of
the Household Below Average Income Survey (HBAI). GSOEP is the German
representative panel household survey (see Wagner et al. (2007) for additional
information concerning the survey) which collects yearly data on socio-economic
conditions since 1984. The data contains information on the La¨nder of residence
of the interviewed households. The HBAI data is drawn from the Family Re-
sources Survey (FRS), which is a continuous cross-sectional survey across Great
Britain running since 1994. The HBAI dataset provides a rich set of informa-
tion about income, household composition and, crucial for our aim, Government
Office Regions, which essentially correspond to the NUTS1 regions.
The three surveys - EUSILC, GSOEP and HBAI - are large nationally represen-
tative surveys with a number of sampled households amounting to respectively
around 137,000 (2009 figures including Norway and Iceland), 12,000 and 25,000.
EU-SILC and GSOEP data record information on total disposable household in-
come as of the previous calendar year, whilst the income reference period for the
HBAI dataset is the financial year (April to March). EUSILC and GSOEP docu-
ment annual household income (aggregate income in a calendar year)while HBAI
provides information on current income (income in the period of the survey in-
terview) on a weekly basis.13 Though we might think that these differences in the
reference could affect the shape of the income distribution and undermine com-
variables which must be present in the data, thus giving some flexibility to how the required
information must be collected.
13For Germany, information on income comes from the Cross-National Equivalent File,
a dataset created by Cornell University in cooperation with DIW-Berlin, ISER-Essex and
StatsCan-Ottawa, consisting of variables from the GSOEP, American PSID, Canadian SLID
and British BHPS. In this file the income variables are annualized, meaning that the typical
GSOEP variables asking about monthly income components have been transformed.
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parability of the inequality measures across surveys, Bo¨heim and Jenkins (2006),
using the British Household Panel Survey, have shown that current income and
annual income definitions lead to very similar estimates of income distribution
statistics. Accordingly, we decided not to apply any transformation to the income
data.
Furthermore, information on household disposable income is recorded in current
prices, meaning that the monetary value of the income is expressed according
to the prices in the survey year. In order to remove the effect of general prices
level, the income variables are set to the 2009 prices by using the Harmonised
Consumer Price Index provided by Eurostat before calculating the inequality
measures. Note that for the UK, the HBAI dataset provides already harmonized
weekly household income within the survey year, and hence takes into account
the different time period in which it is collected.
2.4 Social Outcomes
2.4.1 Indicators of social outcomes
We examine the effect of income inequality on 6 categories of social outcomes: (i)
well-being, (ii) criminality, (iii) health, (iv) social capital, (v) education, and (vi)
political participation. We measure each social outcome with 2 indicators. When
possible, we have selected one objective and one subjective measure based on
self-reported information. Table 9 provides additional information regarding the
definition of each of the selected indicators, while Table 3 presents some summary
statistics.
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2.4.2 Data on social outcomes
The social outcomes are drawn from the following surveys:
• The European Social Survey - ESS
• The European Values Study - EVS
• The European Election database - EED
• The European Survey on Living Conditions EU-SILC, as well as the GSOEP
for Germany and the BHPS for the UK
• The Labor Force Survey - LFS
• The Urban Audit data - UAD
The European Social Survey (ESS) is a biennial study conducted in the ma-
jority of European countries since 2002.14 The ESS contains questions on the
socio-economic characteristics of the respondents and their households but also
includes detailed information on trust in institutions, values, identity, health,
well-being and various aspects of civic and political participation, ranging from
voting turnout to signing a petition, from membership in political parties and
action groups to boycotting certain products. ESS contains a nationally rep-
resentative sample of persons 15 years or older who are resident within private
households, regardless of nationality and citizenship or language. The minimum
effective sample size in participating countries is 1500 if the population is above
than 2 million inhabitants and 850 otherwise. Note that some large countries like
Germany, the UK, or France have large numbers of NUTS 1 regions due to a large
population size. However, the total ESS sample size is about the same for each
country, regardless of the population size and the number of NUTS 1 regions.
This means that the number of respondents in a given region may be relatively
small in big countries. The ESS has been used to build 2 regional indicators
related to political participation and social capital, i.e self-reported voting
behaviors and generalized trust.
The European Values Study (EVS) started in 1981 and has been repeated
every 9 years since then.15 The fourth wave - the one employed in the empirical
analysis - which took place between 2008 and 2010 covered 47 countries/regions,
from Iceland to Azerbaijan and from Portugal to Norway. All EU countries partic-
ipated to the fourth edition of the survey. As the ESS, the EVS provides insights
into the ideas, beliefs, preferences, attitudes, values and opinions of citizens along
14For additional information, see http://ess.nsd.uib.no/ess/.
15 See http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu/ for detailed information.
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additional information of the socio-economic characteristics of the person inter-
viewed. In each country the sample is representative of the adult population of
18 years and older who are resident within private households, regardless of na-
tionality and citizenship or language.16 The average country sample size is 1500.
The EVS has been used to measure subjective well-being and social capital.
The indicator for well being is a self-reported measure of general happiness while
the one on social capital is about participation in charitable organizations.
The European Election database covers 35 countries over the period 1990-
2011 and contains information on parliamentary elections, European Parliament
elections, presidential elections, as well as EU-related referendums in European
countries.17 For each election, the dataset includes information on the number
of persons entitled to vote, numbers of votes cast for each contesting party or
candidate, number of valid votes or the number of invalid votes. Data are mainly
provided by national election authorities, national statistical agencies and other
official sources. The EED provides us with a regional and objective measure of
voter turnout.
The Urban Audit data (UAD) designed by Eurostat, DG REGIO and the
National Statistical Offices covers both medium-sized and large towns/cities. As
defined by Eurostat, medium-sized town/city has a population of between 50,000
and 250,000 inhabitants and large town/city has a population of over 250,000.
Data cover the following period: 1989-1993, 1994-1998, 1999-2002, 2003-2006 and
2007 - 2009. 18 The cities included in the dataset are such that they cover about
“20 % of the country population and reflect a good geographical distribution
within the country” (Eurostat, website). The UAD contains data for over 250
indicators on a various range of issues (demography, social and economic dimen-
sions, criminality, civic participation, education, environment, culture etc). This
data source will be used for constructing an objective indicator of criminality.
The European Union Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS) is a quarterly large
household sample survey conducted in EU Member States (as well as in the
three European Free Trade Association, EFTA, countries and three EU-candidate
countries) which covers all people aged 15 and older. The sampling rate of the
EU-LFS ranges between 0.2% and 3.3% of the population. The database includes
observations on labour market participation as well as several variables related
to the individuals characteristics of the interviewed persons. We have relied on
regional indicators published by Eurostat and drawn from this survey in order to
measure the social outcome related to educational attainment.
16In Finland the sample is representative of the 18-74 years old population.
17see http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/ for additional information
18See http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/region_cities/city_
urban for additional information.
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Finally, the EU-SILC survey (and the SOEP and BHPS surveys respectively
for Germany and the UK) described in section 2 have been employed to derive
regional indicators on health conditions and a subjective measure of crimi-
nality.
2.5 Statistical methods
In the empirical analysis, we examine the relationship between the social outcomes
and income inequality while relying on correlations and regression coefficients.
The correlation coefficient is given by
corr =
cov(Ort, Irt−1)
σIrt−1σOrt
(4)
with cov(Ort, Irt−1) being the covariance between income inequality Irt−1 at time
t− 1 and the social outcome Ort at time t while σIrt−1 and σOrt are the standard
deviations of the corresponding two variables. The correlation coefficient is com-
prised between 0 and 1 with 1 indicating a perfect linear association while −1
correspond to a perfect negative linear association. The sign of the correlation
coefficient indicates whether the correlation is positive or negative and the mag-
nitude of the correlation coefficient determines the strength of the association.
Though there are no fixed thresholds to determine what is a strong correlation, it
is usually admitted that if |corr| < 0.3, the correlation is weak while if |corr| > 0.7
the correlation is strong. Otherwise the correlation is moderate.
The ordinary least squares regression coefficient (OLS) is equal to:
rOLS =
cov(Ort, Irt−1)
σIrt−1σIrt−1
(5)
The OLS regression coefficient can be obtained by estimating the following equa-
tion:
Ort = a+ rOLS ∗ Irt−1 + εrt (6)
where Ort is the social outcome of region r at time t and εr is the residual term of
the equation. The estimated coefficient, r̂OLS, describes the change in the mean
of the social outcome associated with a variation of one unit of Irt−1.
It is very important to keep in mind that both measures assume a linear rela-
tionship between the social outcomes and income disparity. In addition, the fact
that two variables are significantly correlated does not indicate that one causes
the other, no matter how strong is the correlation. The reader should always re-
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member that correlation does not imply causality while reading the entire report
(for additional information, see the discussion in the literature review, section 2).
2.6 Robustness checks
In the appendix, we test the robustness of the results presented in the main part of
the document when (i) alternative income inequality indices, i.e. various Atkinson
indices, are employed (ii) we control for the potential influence of outliers.
2.6.1 Atkinson index
Besides the Gini index and the S80
S20
ratio, a number of alternative inequality indices
have been used in the literature. In particular, income inequality measures such
as the generalised entropy index and the Atkinson index offer the possibility to
look at the inequality in different areas of the income distribution. The Gini
coefficient is highly sensitive to inequalities in the middle of the income spectrum
and, instead, the S80
S20
ratio put more attention to the two extremes of the income
distribution. We have checked the robustness of the correlations between the
social outcomes and income inequality when we use as alternative measure of
income disparity, the Atkinson index.
The Atkinson index is measured as follows:
A = 1− 1
n
n∑
i=1
(
y1−i
μ
) 1
1−
(7)
where yi defines the income level of an individual/household i, μ is the mean
income, n is the number of individuals/households and  is a parameter of sensi-
tiveness to transfers at different levels of the distribution.  can also be understood
as a measure of the degree of “aversion to inequality”. The theoretical range of
Atkinson values is 0 to 1, with 0 being a state of equal distribution. If  > 0, there
is a preference for equality. Larger values of  correspond to a higher concern for
income redistribution (transfers) on the bottom part of the distribution. When 
approaches zero, on the other hand, a higher weight is given to redistribution at
the top. In appendix, we report the correlation and regression coefficients when
we use two different values of  (0.5 and 1).19 An advantage of the Atkinson in-
dex is that it offers a welfare interpretation. More precisely, the Atkinson values
can be used to calculate the proportion of total income that would be required
19The Aktinson index becomes very sensitive to abnormal low incomes when the risk ave-
rion parameter ε is above 1. Note also that the Atkinson index does not consider the indi-
viduals/households which have zero values. In case there is a high proportion of them, this
limitation causes a rigid sample selection, undermining the correct measurement of income
inequality (Atkinson and Marlier, 2010).
to achieve the current level of social welfare if incomes were perfectly distributed.
For example, an Atkinson index value of 0.20 suggests that we could achieve the
same level of social welfare with (1− 0.30) = 70% of income.
2.6.2 Measurement errors and outliers
For some NUTS1 regions the income variable might be recorded with error or have
outliers, i.e. negative and very high income values. Reported negative values are
due to the presence of income losses from self-employment. This might pose issues
for the calculation of the inequality measures. In order to deal with it, we have
adopted a twofold strategy. First, we have adjusted the income for the outliers
by applying a winsorization procedure, which consists of replacing outliers with
selected percentiles. In the present study we have imputed zero to all negative
income data and assigned the 99.9th percentile of the regional income distribution
to the incomes greater than this value. We performed a zeroing imputation to all
negative values mainly to comply with the HBAI and GSOEP dataset, wherein
income has already adjusted for negative values. With the winsorization we
preserve the median of the income distributions and the number of observations
by NUTS1 regions, even tough the mean will not be necessarily equals to the
non-winsorized data.20
Second, estimate equation (6) has been estimated using least absolute deviation
models (LAV). While the OLS estimates consists of minimizing the sum of squares
of residuals, i.e.,
∑R
r=1
[
Ort − a− r̂OLS ∗ Irt−1,
]2
, LAV estimates minimizes the
sum of the absolute residuals, i.e.
∑R
r=1
∣∣Ort − a− r̂LAV ∗ Irt−1, ∣∣. This implies
that LAV estimators are less sensitive to the presence of outliers. All these
robustness checks are reported in appendix, in Tables A.1-A.4.
20Note that we could also have proceeded by trimming the extreme values, but we refrained
from doing so in order to avoid inflating too much the mean of the income distribution. Fur-
thermore, Van Kerm (2007) has shown that winsorizing income data, instead of removing them
from the sample, produces more robust and stable results in the EU-SILC dataset.
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3 Bivariate Correlations
3.1 Inequality across NUTS1 regions
Figures 2 and 3 display the regional distribution of income inequality over the
EU member states using respectively the Gini coefficient and the S80/S20 ratio.
As we discussed in section 2.2, the Gini coefficient is a measure for inequality and
varies from 0, i.e. perfect equality to 1, i.e. perfect inequality. In our dataset,
the range of the Gini is somewhat small, with lowest values ranging around 0.22
and highest values of the Gini being at 0.43. Darker blue areas in Figures 2
and 3 refer to NUTS 1 regions with higher income inequality and the light blue
areas refer to areas with less inequality. Regions with particularly high levels
of income inequality can be found in some Eastern-European countries, such as
Latvia, Lithuania, Central Poland (PL1), Romania, parts of Bulgaria (BG3), as
well as in Portugal and various regions in the UK. In addition to the variation of
income inequality across European countries, we also observe substantial within-
country variations for example for Spain, Italy, the UK, France and Germany.
The latter country’s variation of income inequality is particularly striking, as the
Gini coefficient varies from 0.22-0.24 for Eastern German regions to a maximum
value of 0.33 in DE7.
On the other hand, regions with particularly low levels of income inequality can
be found in Finland, Sweden, parts of Germany (DED, DEG), Hungary, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Czech Republic, Austria, and in Belgium.
Now turning to the second income inequality measure, we can confirm the pattern
seen for the Gini coefficient. The values for the S80/S20 measure vary from 2.9
to 9. As discussed in section II, the S80/S20 has a straightforward interpretation.
For example, if the value of the S80/S20 equals to 2.95 then this implies that the
income of the richest 20% of the population is higher by a factor of 2.95 than
the income of the poorest 20%. In this respect, higher values of the S80/S20
measure point to more unequal distribution of income in a NUTS region. As
already seen for the Gini coefficient, the most unequal regions can be found in
Latvia, Lithuania, Central Poland (PL1), Romania, parts of Bulgaria (BG3), as
well as in South and Central Spain, Portugal and various regions in the UK. The
regions with the most equal income distribution are similar to those noted for the
Gini coefficient. Again, we observe very high within-country differences in the
value of the s80/s20 ratio, with the highest variations displayed for Germany.
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Figure 2: Gini coefficient across NUTS 1 regions.
AT1
AT2
AT3
BE1BE2
BE3
BG3
BG4
CH0
CY0
CZ0
DE1
DE2
DE34
DE5
DE6
DE7
DE8
DE9
DEA
DEB
DEC
DED
DEE
DEF
DEG
DK0
EE0
ES1
ES2
ES3ES4 ES5
ES6
FI1
FI2
FR1
FR2
FR3
FR4
FR5
FR6
FR7
FR8
GR1
GR2
GR3
GR4
HU1
HU2
HU3
IE0
ITC ITD
ITE
ITF
ITG
LI0
LT0
LU0
LV0
MT0
NL
NL1
NL2NL3
NL4
PL1
PL2
PL3
PL4
PL5
PL6
PT1
RO1
RO2
RO3
RO4
SE1
SE2
SE3
SI0
SK0
UKC
UKD UKE
UKF
UKG UKH
UKIUKJUKK
UKL
UKM
UKN 0.34 − 0.43
0.31 − 0.34
0.30 − 0.31
0.28 − 0.30
0.26 − 0.28
0.22 − 0.26
Source: Authors’ calculations on EU-SILC, GSOEP and HBAI 2009 data.
Darker blue corresponds to higher values of the Gini index.
3.2 Happiness and income inequality
3.2.1 Rationale
The discussion on whether income inequality affects an individual’s happiness
dates back to theoretical considerations on relative deprivation and relative utility
and refers to the idea that people’s utility depends not only on their own income
but also on their relative position in the society (van de Stadt, Kapteyn and
van de Geer, 1985). In addition, some scholars suggest that individuals can have
a “taste for equality”. In particular, Thurow (1971, p.327) proposes that “the
individual is simply exercising an aesthetic taste for equality or inequality similar
in nature to a taste for paintings”.
An intuitive and comprehensive explanation of the impact of income inequality on
individuals’ well-being is provided by Hirschman and Rothschild (1973). These
authors use the analogy of a traffic jam on a two-lane motorway to explain the ef-
fect of income inequality on happiness and call this the “tunnel effect” (Hirschman
and Rothschild (1973), p.545): “Suppose that I drive through a two-lane tunnel,
both lanes going the same direction, and run into a serious traffic jam. No car
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Figure 3: S80/S20 ratio across NUTS 1 regions
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is moving in either lane as far as I can see (which is not very far). I am in the
left lane and feel dejected. After a while the cars in the right lane begin to move.
Naturally, my spirits lift considerably, for I know that the jam has been broken
and that my lane’s turn to move will surely come any moment now. But suppose
that the expectation is disappointed and only the right lane keeps moving: in
that case I will at some point become quite furious”.
This analogy nicely illustrates several important aspects in the relationship be-
tween income inequality and happiness. First, inequality may convey information
about future prospects. This means that if I observe that the people around me
are moving, then I expect to be able to move upward soon too. This suggests that
income inequality might have a positive effect on individuals’s wellbeing. Second,
the positive impact of inequality might turn negative if these expectations are
not fulfilled, i.e. if my lane is still not moving. This has important consequences
for countries in different development stages and there is empirical evidence on
transition countries supporting this notion (as discussed below). Last, the ques-
tion arises at what point people do get “upset” about their lane not moving. This
refers to people’s beliefs on whether mobility is possible in their country and how
difficult it is for people to move upwards.
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In conclusion, income inequality might affect positively the individual’s level of
happiness if people perceive that in their society upward mobility is possible.
However, if individuals think that it is very unlikely to reach a higher income,
then income inequality will probably impact negatively on happiness.
3.2.2 Bivariate correlations
We investigate the effect of income inequality on happiness by relying on two
indicators. The first indicator is taken from the European Value Survey (EVS),
2008 and is drawn from the following question: “Taking all things together, would
you say you are: very happy, quite happy, not very happy, or not at all happy”.
The indicator ranges from 4, i.e. very happy, to 0, i.e. not at all happy. Hap-
piness scores in our dataset on EU Member States vary from 2.6 to 3.5. The
second indicator measures life satisfaction in the population and is drawn from
the European Social Survey. In particular, the indicator is derived from the re-
sponses to the following question “All things considered, how satisfied are you
with your life as a whole nowadays?”. Values might range from 0 meaning ex-
tremely dissatisfied to 10 meaning extremely satisfied, however in our sample the
lowest values correspond to 4.3 and the maximum value equals to 8.5. For most
countries, data is drawn for the year 2008; but due to missing data the year 2006
is used for Austria and Luxembourg, and 2010 is used for the Czech Republic and
Spain. Unfortunately, in the European Social Survey, no information is available
for Italy. The two indicators constitute the main measure of happiness employed
in the literature (see literature review, 3.1.2).
Figure 4 displays the regional distribution of life satisfaction over the NUTS 1
regions in Europe. Life satisfaction is particularly high in the Nordic countries,
Sweden, Denmark and Finland, as well as in the Netherlands, UK, Ireland, and
Austria. Comparably low life satisfaction on the other hand can be found in
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, as well as Portugal,
parts of eastern Germany, parts of France (i.e. Me´diterrane´e, Bassin Parisien,
and Nord-Pas-de-Calais).
In addition, Figure 5 shows how the second measure of happiness taken from the
European Social Survey varies over Europe. The main pattern observed from the
graph on life satisfaction remains robust. In addition, we observe a stark within-
country variation on perceived happiness, such as in Germany (here happiness
scores ranging from lowest (2.6) to higher (3.2)).
Using this regional information we correlate the life satisfaction outcomes with
our two income inequality measures. In particular Figure 6 depicts the pairwise
correlations between life satisfaction and the Gini index (top panel of Fig. 6)
and life satisfaction and the S80/S20 ratio (bottom panel of Fig. 6). For both
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Figure 4: Happiness across NUTS1 regions.
AT1
AT2
AT3
BE1BE2
BE3
BG3
BG4
CH0
CY0
CZ0
DE1
DE2
DE34
DE5
DE6
DE7
DE8
DE9
DEA
DEB
DEC
DED
DEE
DEF
DEG
DK0
EE0
ES1
ES2
ES3ES4 ES5
ES6
FI1
FI2
FR1
FR2
FR3
FR4
FR5
FR6
FR7
FR8
GR1
GR2
GR3
GR4
HU1
HU2
HU3
IE0
ITC ITD
ITE
ITF
ITG
LI0
LT0
LU0
LV0
MT0
NL
NL1
NL2NL3
NL4
PL1
PL2
PL3
PL4
PL5
PL6
PT1
RO1
RO2
RO3
RO4
SE1
SE2
SE3
SI0
SK0
UKC
UKD UKE
UKF
UKG UKH
UKIUKJUKK
UKL
UKM
UKN
 Happiness (score )
3.3 − 3.5
3.2 − 3.3
3.1 − 3.2
3.0 − 3.1
2.9 − 3.0
2.6 − 2.9
No data
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on the EVS. Darker blue corresponds to higher happiness scores.
inequality indices, we cannot identify a relationship between higher inequality
and lower life satisfaction statistically significant at 5 percent level. This is true
for both indicators and irrespectively of the income inequality index used. When,
as presented in the Appendix Tables A1-A3, we use alternative specifications
concerning the inequality measure, i.e. Atkinson index, as well as different esti-
mation method, i.e. LAV estimator and winsorized income data, we confirm the
absence of a significant relationship between income inequality and self-reported
well-being.
3.3 Voting behaviors and income inequality
3.3.1 Rationale
According to the class-bias hypothesis, economic inequality should lower the po-
litical participation of the poorer citizens. The idea is that concentrations of
wealth and power are related to each other. Rich individuals will have more
power than the poorer ones on the political scene, preventing discussions about
issues that are important for the poor fringe of the population. As the opinion
of the low-income group is are not taken into account for designing policies, the
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Figure 5: Life Satisfaction across NUTS1 regions.
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expected benefits from voting are lower for this group than for the high-income
group leading the former to opt out of civic engagement (see Horn, 2011). The
implication of the class bias hypothesis is that voter turnout and economic in-
equality should be negatively related to each other (Solt, 2010, and Mueller and
Stratmann, 2003).
Under the assumption that (i) government policies are directly responsive to the
preferences of the citizens expressed in elections and (ii) government policies affect
the distribution of income, through taxation and transfers, a reduced engagement
of the low-income group means that elected political leaders will put into place
policies that will only reflect the preferences of high-income groups. As put by
Lijphart (1997, p.1) and reported in Mueller and Stratmann (2003) low partic-
ipation in elections will lead to“inequality of representation and influence that
are not randomly distributed but systematically biased in favor of more privi-
leged citizens, those with higher income, greater wealth and better education and
against the less advantaged citizen”. This argument fits with the median voter
hypothesis (see Meltzer and Richard, 1981). If turnout is skewed by income, the
income of the median voter will be higher than the mean income of the country,
and this will lead to a lower demand for taxes and transfers which will induce
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Figure 6: Bivariate correlations between subjective well-being indicators
and income inequality.
AT1
AT2 AT3
BE1
BE2
BE3
BG3
BG4
CY0
CZ0
DE1
DE2
DE3
DE4
DE5
DE6
DE7
DE8
DE9 DEA
DEB
DEC
DED
DEE
DEF
DEG
DK0
EE0
ES1
ES2
ES3
ES4ES5 ES6ES7
FI1
FR1FR2
FR3FR4FR5 FR6
FR7
FR8 GR1
GR2GR3
GR4
HU1
HU2
HU3
IE0
IS0
ITC
ITD
ITEITF
ITG
LT0
LU0
LV0
NL
PL1
PL2
PL3PL4
PL5
PL6
PTRO1
RO2
RO3RO4
SE1SE2SE3
SI0
SK0
UKC
UKD
UKE UKF
UKG
UKH
UKI
UKJ
UKK
UKL
UKM
UKN
2.
6
2.
8
3
3.
2
3.
4
3.
6
H
ap
pi
ne
ss
 (s
co
re)
.2 .25 .3 .35 .4 .45
Gini index
Correlation: −0.06
OLS coefficient: −0.27
N: 90
AT1
AT2AT3
BE1
BE2
BE3
BG3
BG4
CY0
CZ0
DE1
DE2
DE3
DE4
DE5
DE6
DE7
DE8
DE9DEA
DEB
DEC
DED
DE
DEF
DEG
DK0
EE0
ES1
ES2
ES3
ES4ES5 ES6ES7
FI1
FR1FR2
FR3FR4FR5 FR6
FR7
FR8 GR1
GR2GR3
GR4
HU1
HU2
HU3
IE0
IS0
ITC
ITD
IT ITF
ITG
LT0
LU0
LV0
NL
PL1
PL2
PL3PL4
PL5
PL6
PTRO1
RO2
RO3RO4
SE1SE2SE3
SI0
SK0
UKC
UKD
UKE UKF
UKG
UKH
UKI
UKJ
UKK
UKL
UKM
UKN
2.
6
2.
8
3
3.
2
3.
4
3.
6
H
ap
pi
ne
ss
 (s
co
re)
2 4 6 8 10
S80/S20 ratio
Correlation: −0.12
OLS coefficient: −0.02
N: 90
AT1
AT2
AT3
BE1
BE2
BE3
BG3BG4
CY0
CZ0
DE1 DE2
DE3
DE4
DE5
DE6 DE7
DE8
DE9
DEADEB
DEC
DED
DEE DEF
DEG
DK0
EE0
ES1
ES2
S3
ES4ES5
ES6
ES7
FI1
FR1
FR2FR3
FR4
FR5 FR6
FR7 FR8
GR1
GR2GR3
GR4
HU1
HU2
HU3
IE0
LT0
LV0
NL
NO0
PL1PL2PL3
PL4PL5PL6
PT
RO1
RO2
RO3
RO4
SE1SE2SE3
SI0
SK0
UKC UKD
UKE
UKF
UKG UKH UKI
UKJUKK
UKL
UKMUKN
4
5
6
7
8
9
Li
fe
 s
at
isf
ac
tio
n 
(sc
ore
)
.2 .25 .3 .35 .4 .45
Gini index
Correlation: −0.20
OLS coefficient: −3.35
N: 84
AT1
AT2
AT3
BE1
BE2
BE3
BG3BG4
CY0
CZ0
DE1 DE2
DE3
DE4
DE5
DE6 DE7
DE8
DE9
DEADEB
DEC
DED
DEE DEF
DEG
DK0
EE0
ES1
ES2
ES3
ES4ES5
ES6
ES7
FI1
FR1
FR2FR3
FR4
FR5 FR6
FR7 FR8
GR1
GR2GR3
GR4
HU1
HU2
HU3
IE0
LT0
LV0
NL
NO0
PL1PL2PL3
PL4PL5PL6
PT
RO1
RO2
RO3
RO4
SE1SE2SE3
SI0
SK0
UKCUKD
UKE
UKF
UKG UKH UKI
UKJUKK
UKL
UKMUKN
4
5
6
7
8
9
Li
fe
 s
at
isf
ac
tio
n 
(sc
ore
)
2 4 6 8 10
S80/S20 ratio
Correlation: −0.18
OLS coefficient: −0.11
N: 84
Source: Authors’ calculations. ∗∗ significant at 5% percent level.
an increase of inequality (see Milanovic, 2000, Malher, 2008 for empirical tests of
median voter hypothesis).21
The relationship between turnout and inequality is thus likely to be mutually
reinforcing. A low political participation leads to economic inequality if this par-
ticipation is lower among the low-income groups than for the rest of the popula-
tion. In turn, rising economic inequality risks discouraging participation among
low-income groups, and so on.
The conflict theory, on the other hand, predicts the opposite. Rising income
inequality should result in more political engagement. Indeed, greater level of
inequality causes disagreements in political preferences that spurs discussions
about the suitable policies. These discussions are then seen to cause higher rates
of political mobilizations and to stimulate more interest and participation in the
political interest. As explained in Horn (2011), under the premise of the rational
21Horn (2011) argues that the effect of increasing inequality on turnout might depend on
whether this increase is driven by the growth of top income or, on contrary, by a relative
deterioration of the situation of the low-income group. In the first case, low and medium
income group could unite together to promote redistributive policies that favor the medium
income group and which are more favorable for the low-income group than policies that would
be designed for the most advantaged groups. Under such circumstances, the low-income group
might have an additional incentive to vote. The opposite will happen if rising income inequality
is due to a decrease of the income of the low-income group relatively to the rest of the population.
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voter hypothesis, if inequality is low, both low and high-income groups might
have a low incentive to vote if one consider that redistributive policies are the
main issues decided by governments as none of the two groups has a lot to lose.
The opposite will be observed if inequality is high.
3.3.2 Bivariate correlations
We investigate the effect of income inequality on political participation using 2
variables related to voting behaviors.22 Information on voter turnout has been
widely employed in the literature to compare political participation across coun-
tries and examine its determinants (Dee 2004; Milligan et al. 2004; Siedler 2007).
The first variable is the proportion of individuals in each region reporting to have
voted at the last national election. This information, based on self-reported infor-
mation, is drawn from the 2010 and 2008 waves of the European Social Survey,
except for Austria for which we have used the 2006 wave of the same survey. In-
formation is missing for Luxembourg and Italy. As shown, in Figure 7, the highest
self-reported turnout are found in Sweden, Denmark, Belgium, and Greece. The
voter turnout percentage amounts to 88% in Denmark and more to 80% in Greece,
Sweden or the Netherlands. Low voter turnouts are observed in Baltic countries.
Less than one interviewed individuals out of two report to have voted at the last
national election in Lithuania. The voting participation rate is equal to 0.56 and
0.57 respectively in Latvia and Estonia. Within-country variation in voting par-
ticipation are substantial: in the West of France (FR5), the voter turnout rate
is equal to 0.76 against 0.64 in the East of France (FR7). Similarly, this figure
ranges between 0.58 and 0.73 in the UK.
The overall voting rates emerging from survey data are usually higher than voting
rates registered in general elections. Respondents tend to intentionally misreport
that they voted because they feel that there is a social stigma associated with
failing to cast ballots. We thus also rely on a second measure based on official
records and which will not suffer from the limitations associated with self-reported
information. This variable is taken from the European Election database and
measures the actual turnout at the last country parliamentary election over the
period 2005-2010. Unfortunately, information is missing for Italy and France.23
22Note that, the dataset we have compiled contains several additional variables related to
political involvement. In particular, the ESS collects data on political interest, party prefer-
ences and participation to activities such as political parties (see in appendix for additional
information on these variables we have to prepare an appendix with variables/codebook). The
bivariate analysis for these variables is not reported here. However should the reader be inter-
ested in these particular outcomes, it would be possible to carry out the same analysis as the
one done for voting behavior.
23It is not possible to compare directly these objective and subjective indicators as they
potentially refer to different national elections.
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Figure 7: Self-reported voting behaviour across NUTS1 regions.
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Darker blue corresponds to higher percentages of self-reported turnout.
As shown, in Figure 8, voter turnouts above 80% are recorded in Sweden, Den-
mark, Belgium and Luxembourg. In comparison, in some Eastern and Baltic
countries such as Poland, Romania, or Lithuania, voting participation oscillates
between 37% and 50%. There is a third group of countries, composed in particular
of the UK, Germany, Spain, Greece, Slovenia, or Slovakia whose voting partici-
pation rates lay between 50% and 70%. Though, on average, regional disparities
within countries seem to be less important than with the previous indicator, still
some countries display substantial heterogeneity in voting participation. There
is, for instance, a 17 percentage points difference between the central and south
regions of Poland in the share of individuals having participated at the last par-
liamentary election.
Figure 9 reports the bivariate correlations between the voting behavior indicators
and the inequality indexes. These correlations indicate that there is a negative
and significantly different from zero association between income inequality and
voting behaviors at the regional level. The correlation between self-reported
voting behaviors and the Gini coefficient amounts to -0.38 and to -0.36 when
the inequality index is the S80/S20 ratio. From the OLS estimates, we see that
an increase of 0.1 in the value of the Gini coefficient is associated with a 6.3
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Figure 8: Voter turnout across NUTS1 regions.
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Darker blue corresponds to higher percentages of voter turnout.
percentage points decrease in the percentage of individuals reporting to have
voted at the last national election. The regression coefficient when the inequality
index is the S80/S20 ratio is equal to -0.02. i.e. an increase of S80/S20 by one
is equivalent to a reduction of the self reported voter turnout percentage rate by
2.1 percentage points.
This negative relationship between income disparities and political involvement is
confirmed with the objective measure of voter turnout. In this case the magnitude
of the correlation is even (if slightly) higher, with the correlation coefficient lying
between -0.44 and -0.47 according the selected inequality index. More precisely,
the estimated regression coefficients indicate that a 0.1 rise in the Gini index
corresponds to a 11.7 percentage points drop in the subjective indicator of voter
turnout while an increase of the S80/S20 ratio accounts for a 4.7 percentage
points decrease in the value of the objective measure of voting turnout.
Results reported in Tables A.1-A.4 shows that the correlation between income
inequality and recorded turnout is negative and significantly different from zero,
irrespective of the inequality index or estimation method employed. The self-
reported indicator on voting behavior displays also negative and significantly
different from zero association with income inequality in most of case, though the
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Figure 9: Bivariate correlations between voting behavior indicators and in-
come inequality.
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strength of the association tends to be lower when we rely on methods robust to
outliers.
3.4 Social capital and income inequality
3.4.1 Rationale
The term social capital is often traced back to the work of the sociologist Bour-
dieu (1977), but it gained popularity with the seminal work of Coleman (1990)
and Putnam (1993). Recently, Guiso et al. (2008) define social capital as “good”
culture, i.e., a set of beliefs and values that facilitate cooperation among the
members. The authors show that social capital can be measured by both di-
rect indicators (such as generalized trust) and indirect indicators (such as blood
donations, or membership in charitable organizations).
There is a large consensus that heterogeneity is one important factor reducing the
formation of social capital. Usually, community heterogeneity refers to income
inequality but also ethnicity, and racial heterogeneity, though here, we concen-
trate our attention on economic inequality. Several mechanisms could explain the
association between economic inequality and social capital.
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First, individuals might be adverse to heterogeneity. In other words, they prefer
having contacts with individuals that are similar to themselves, i.e. that belong to
the same socioeconomic group. The genetic bases for ethnical preferences in mate
selection are discussed in Richard Dawkins (The selfish Gene) and Jared Diamond
(The Third Chimpanzee) works. We focus here on socio-economic status. In
heterogeneous societies contacts between dissimilar individuals will be at a lower
rate than in more homogeneous societies. Repeated interactions being conducive
of social capital and trust, heterogeneous societies are thus characterized by fewer
contacts and, in consequence, by lower levels of cooperation and trust (see the
seminal work by Colman, 1990, and Alesina et al, 2002 for instance).24 This
aversion to heterogeneity can be driven by the fact that individuals from different
socioeconomic groups are less likely to share common values and norms which
makes it more difficult for them to predict the attitudes of others. This creates
an environment not favorable to the development of social capital (Knack and
Keefer, 1997).
Second, when resources are not evenly distributed, poor individuals might per-
ceive that they are living in an unfair society where the rich tend to exploit the
poor. This will lead individuals at the bottom end of the income distribution
to develop distrust against richer individuals (Rothstein and Uslaner, 2004). Us-
laner and Brown (2005) argue that when income inequality is high, individuals
from different socioeconomic groups will have the sensation that they are not
sharing the same fate, and this will hamper trust.
Third, inequality should relate to the level of optimism. A higher level of in-
equality is likely to reduce the level of optimism for the future and thereby trust
(Uslaner and Brown, 2005, Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005).
Finally, economic inequality increases the incentives for dishonest comportments
directed against the rich, by the poor people. This implies that poor people will
be less trustworthy, which will, thereby, reduce the level of social capital of richer
individuals.
3.4.2 Bivariate correlations
We rely on 2 indicators to operationalize social capital: one is about trust while
the other refers to participation in voluntary organizations.
The use of trust to proxy cognitive social capital is motivated by several academic
papers. Guiso et al. (2008, 2010) consider that direct indicators such as general-
24It is also possible that in more heterogeneous societies, contacts with dissimilar individuals
are more frequent than in homogeneous societies, and because, on average people distrust
those that are dissimilar from themselves, then, the level of trust tends to be lower in more
heterogeneous societies.
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ized trust fit well with the definition of social capital as an individual belief about
the willingness of other members of the community to cooperate. 25.
Information on trust is available in various cross-country surveys. Here, we rely
on the European Social Survey in which respondents are asked if they believe that
people can be trusted, or if, on contrary, we cannot be too careful in dealing with
others. This variable ranges from 0 to 10 with 10 meaning that most people can be
trusted while the value 0 means that we cannot be too careful. The information is
drawn from the 2008 or 2010 surveys for all countries but for Austria for which we
had to use the 2006 wave. Data on trust are missing for Italt and Luxembourg.
Figure 10 maps the average level of trust across European NUTS1 regions. The
highest level of trust is reported in Nordic countries such as Denmark, Finland,
Sweden or the Netherlands while, on contrary, Eastern and South European coun-
tries such as Poland,Romania, Bulgaria or Portugal tend to display lower levels
of trust. In Denmark, the trust indicator scores on average at 7 whereas in Portu-
gal, the same indicator is equal to 3.8. Disparities within countries are noticeable
in Spain and Germany. Between the region Sachsen-Anhalt (DEE) and Baden-
Wurttemberg (DE1), there is a 1.1 point difference in the average level of trust
(4.0 and 5.1 respectively). In Spain, the level of trust ranges between 4.6 and 5.3.
Next, we use an indicator of individual participation in local organisations de-
noted by membership. We focus on “Putnamesque” networks involving “horizon-
tal egalitarian relationship” rather than on networks based on “vertical hierar-
chical relationships”. The variable membership is based on individual responses
taken from the 2008-2010 European Values Study and measures the proportion
of individuals in each region which are a member of one of the following organ-
isations: human rights, conservation, environment, ecology, animal rights, youth
work, sports or recreation, women’s group, peace movement, or organizations con-
cerned with health. This type of indicator has been largely used in the literature
either in this form or in a closely related formulation and is intended to mea-
sure “structural” social capital, i.e social networks that entails mutual beneficial
actions. Note however that though being member of an organization might be
desirable per se, it does not convey automatically benefits expected from struc-
tural social capital as the actual benefices will depend on the type of relationship
within the organization.
Figure 11 shows that participation in Putnamesque organizations greatly varies
across Europe. Countries, such as Sweden, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Bel-
gium and Germany report the highest figures whilst Poland, Romania or Spain
display low levels of participation. In Denmark and Luxembourg, respectively
more than 70% and 50% of interviewed individuals are member of one of the
25See Uphoff and Wijayaratna (2000) for a discussion on the distinction between structural
and cognitive social capital.
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Figure 10: Trust across NUTS1 regions.
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organizations described above. In comparison, in Poland and Romania this in-
dicator scores below 10%. Regional variations within countries are substantial.
For instance, in South-West and East of England, participation rates are about
20% higher than the national average.
In general, the two indicators of social capital show that Nordic countries display
high level of social capital while, in comparison, Eastern and Southern countries
are embodied with lower levels of social capital.
After having shown the distribution of our 2 proxies for social capital across
Europe, we now turn to inspect whether income inequality might have an effect on
this social outcome variable. Figure 12 displays the pairwise correlations between
the two social capital indicators and the two measures of income inequality. The
bivariate correlations are negative and significantly different from zero for both
social capital indicators, though of relatively limited magnitude. The bivariate
correlations range between -0.18 and -0.26. The regression coefficients do not
suggest any significantly different from zero relationship between trust and both
inequality measures.. Findings for the proxy of structural capital (membership)
show that a 0.1 increase in the Gini coefficient corresponds with a 6.8 percentage
points reduction in the proportion of individuals participating in Putnamesque
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Figure 11: Membership across NUTS1 regions.
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organizations. The estimated regression coefficient associated with the S80/S20
ratio is equal to -0.031.
Results reported in Tables A.1-A.4 shows that the correlation between income
inequality and social capital is negative and significantly different from zero, ir-
respective of the inequality index or the estimation method employed when the
indicator is a proxy for structural social capital. However, the relationship be-
tween generalized trust and income disparity is sensitive to the income disparity
index and estimation method employed.
3.5 Health and income inequality
3.5.1 Rationale
In the past 20 years more than hundred published articles have been trying to
disentangle the relationship between income inequality and health (Lynch et al.,
2004). This amount of research already indicates that it is far from easy to
clearly link income inequality to health outcomes. Part of the problem is the lack
of a widely accepted rationale on why wider income distribution should affect an
individual’s health status. A part of the empirical evidence even suggests that
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Figure 12: Bivariate correlations between social capital indicators and in-
come inequality.
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the causality runs in the other way, i.e. from health to inequality. In the following
paragraphs, the three most widely mechanisms to connect income inequality and
health are discussed (Leigh et al., 2009, Deaton, 2003, and Gravelle, 1998).
The absolute income hypothesis postulates that an individual’s health status in-
creases with individual income but at a decreasing rate (see Figure 13). This
means that one extra Euro given to a deprived person increases his/her health
status more than the same Euro spent on a rich person. Hence, there exists a non-
linear relationship between income and health status. Figure 14 illustrates this
argument by displaying at the country level the bivariate relationship between life
expectancy and GDP per capita. This non-linear relationship was found between
countries when comparing richer and poorer countries but also within countries
(Leigh et al., 2009). As Deaton (2003) argues, this supports the idea that within a
country a redistribution of income from richer to poorer individuals will increase
the overall health status. In other words, under the absolute income hypothe-
sis an effect of income inequality on health would be caused by the non-linear
relationship of income and health.
The second mechanism proposed in the literature is the relative income hypothesis.
The relative income hypothesis postulates that an individual’s relative income
position within a country affects the individual’s health status. The rationale for
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Figure 13: Non-linear relationship of income and health.
Source: Leigh et al., 2009, p. 6.
this hypothesis is not clearly spelled out in the literature. Most scholars, however,
propose the following mechanism: lower relative income increases chronic stress
of individuals, due to an increased feeling of deprivation. This chronic stress is
then seen to translate into an unhealthier life (Leigh et al., 2009).
The last mechanism to explain why income inequality might affect health is the
idea of societal effects and, in particular, the effect of increased violence due to
higher income inequality. Higher violence and crime rates might lead to higher
death rates (i.e. homicides) but also to increased levels of stress, which then
translate into worse health outcomes. The effect of income inequality on crime is
discussed more extensively in section 3.6. Other societal effects mentioned in the
literature are related to societal heterogeneity. In particular, greater heterogene-
ity is seen to hinder societies to agree on investments in public goods (Alesina
et al., 1999). This implies, that higher income inequality might lead to lower
investments in the health sector, e.g. in hospitals, and this then might trans-
late into lower health status of the surrounding population (Leigh et al., 2009).
Moreover, higher income inequality is also related to lower levels of trust which
in turn might increase anxiety and stress levels.
Note, as we already mentioned above, researchers not only propose a causal re-
lationship between income inequality and health, but also support the reciprocal
relationship, i.e. the effect of increased health status on income. In particular,
scholars propose that health can affect income via labor market effects, educa-
tional effects and marriage market effects (Leigh et al., 2009). Leigh et al. (2009)
argue that unhealthier individuals have more difficulties in finding and retaining
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Figure 14: Cross-country evidence of life expectancy and income.
Source: Deaton, 2003, p. 116.
a job and in obtaining a promotion, thereby having lower levels of income (some
evidence on this link can be found in Gertler and Gruber, 2002). Second, im-
proved health of students is positively related to educational attainment and to
lower dropout rates of students, causing an increased income later in life. Last,
Leigh et al. (2009) argue that healthier people are more likely to marry and build
stable relationships, which additionally affects income levels.
3.5.2 Bivariate correlations
We have chosen two different measures of health status for the bivariate corre-
lations. The first measure relates to the self assessed health status, and thereby
refers to a subjective measure of health. More precisely, this indicator is measures
the average score from 1 (very good) to 5 (very bad) of the self-defined health
status on the NUTS 1 level of the European countries. Data are drawn from the
2008 EU-SILC survey, or from the 2008 ESS when the information is missing.
Figure 15 displays the spatial distribution of values for self-assessed health, with
darker blue areas referring to worse self-assessed health and lighter blue areas
to better levels of subjective health status on the NUTS 1 level. People in the
Nordic countries, i.e. Denmark, Sweden and Finland, as well as in several west-
ern European countries, such as UK, the Netherlands, parts of Belgium, Austria,
and Ireland perceive that they have a particularly good health status. Note-
worthy is the particularly high perceived health status in Greece in contrast to
neighboring countries, which report, comparatively, a low health status. In gen-
eral, self-reported health is low in Eastern-European countries (including Eastern
Germany), as well as in Italy, Portugal, and in the Northern parts of Spain.
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While this first indicator on health refers to subjective evaluations of health
status, we employ additionally a somewhat more objective indicator of health
status, namely an indicator on chronic diseases in the population. More precisely,
this indicator constitutes the proportion of people in a NUTS 1 region who replied
yes to following question: “Do you have any longstanding illness or longstanding
health problem?”. Data are drawn EU-SILC for most countries, and from SOEP
and USS for respectively Germany and the UK. Data employed on chronic diseases
refers to the year 2006, and missing values in Germany, Sweden, UK and Bulgaria
are replaced by data belonging to the 2008-2010. No data on chronic health was
available for Romania.
Figure 16 shows the spatial distribution of the percentage of the population with
chronic disease across NUTS 1 regions. Darker blue areas in Figure 16 refers to
higher percentages of people with a chronic disease. From Figure 16, it is difficult
to establish a clear pattern. Especially high levels of chronic disease appear in
Finland, Germany, UK, Estonia, Latvia, and Hungary. On the opposite side are
Italy, Greece, Austria as well as the Flemish part of Belgium and the eastern part
of Spain with comparably low percentages of the population indicating a chronic
disease. The map on chronic diseases across NUTS1 regions produces surprising
findings. One underlying reason might be that chronic disease are more easily
detected in societies with otherwise good health care provision and thus high
levels of health in the population.
After having displayed the regional distribution of the two health indicators, the
next step is to investigate the interrelation of the health indicators with income
inequality. Figure 17 provides the pairwise correlations between the two health
indicators, i.e. self-assessed health and chronic diseases, and the two income
inequality measures, i.e. the Gini index and the S80/S20 ratio. The correlations
are very low (i.e., range between 0.08 and 0.14) and not significantly different from
zero. This is true for both health indicators, irrespective of the income disparity
index employed. Results reported in Tables A.1-A.4 confirm the absence of a
clear correlation between health and income inequality.
3.6 Criminality and income inequality
3.6.1 Rationale
The determinants of criminality, and in particular the role played by income
inequality, has attracted the attention of scientists from various disciplines.
Economic theories for criminal activities date back to Becker (1968) and stress
that a criminal act is the result of a rational decision based on a cost-benefit anal-
ysis. Individuals decide to participate or not in criminal activities by comparing
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Figure 15: Self-reported health across NUTS1 regions.
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the returns of criminal and legal activities. The net return of a criminal act is
the difference between the loot and the associated costs such as the opportunity
cost and the severity of punishment if the individual is caught while committing
the crime. Income inequality should increase the potential gain derived from a
criminal act for individuals situated at the bottom end of the income distribution
because the gap between their income and the country mean income is larger,
relatively to a situation in which the resources would be more evenly distributed.
Sociological theories sustain that criminal activities result from a feeling of frus-
tration of the less well-off people when they compare their situation with respect
to the one of wealthier individuals. The higher is income inequality, the greater is
the sentiment of unfairness of disadvantaged individuals. Economic deprivation
and the associated feeling of resentment might spur criminal behaviors (Morgan,
2000, citing, in particular, Merton’s work, 1938).
3.6.2 Bivariate correlations
Typically, crime statistics used in empirical studies refers to homicide, robbery
and property crime rates. In the following, we have also relied on one similar
objective measure of crime. We complement it with one indicator of crime
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Figure 16: Chronic Diseases across NUTS1 regions.
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based on individual perceptions.
The first indicator is drawn from the Urban Audit Data (UAD). As explained in
section 2.4, this dataset covers both medium-sized and large towns/cities in EU
countries. Around 337 cities covering 28 countries are included in the database,
i.e, an average of 12 cities per country. In order to make possible the analysis at
the regional level, these cities have been matched with the corresponding NUTS1
level. This limitation has to be taken into account while looking at the bivariate
association. In what follows we have selected as indicator of criminality the
number of burglary per 1000 inhabitants. All countries and NUTS1 regions are
covered except for Greece and Romania. Most of the data come from the 2007-
2009 period, though for France, Denmark, Cyprus, and the Netherlands we had
to rely on the previous period, i.e 2003-2006.
Figure 18 indicates that the number of burglary per 1000 inhabitants is the highest
in the UK, Netherlands and Belgium. Relatively high numbers of burglary are also
reported in Ireland, Denmark and Ireland. Within countries, a higher burglary
rate is usually registered in the NUTS1 regions hosting the country’s capital.
The subjective indicator of crime aims at measuring, at the regional level, the
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Figure 17: Bivariate correlations between health indicators and income in-
equality.
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proportion of individuals that feels crime, violence or vandalism to be a problem
for the household. Data are drawn from the EU-SILC survey for all countries but
Germany and UK. For these two countries, we have respectively employed the
SOEP and BHPS surveys. The data period is 2007 for most of countries, though
for Germany and Denmark, the indicator respectively corresponds to the year
2009 and 2006 while for Sweden and Bulgaria we use information from the 2008
year.
As shown in Figure 19, the perception of crime is the highest in the UK with
around 50% of the respondents reporting that crime, violence or vandalism to be
a problem in their living area. Latvia and Bulgaria also display high values for
this indicator. In contrast, individuals living in Germany as well as in Eastern
countries such as Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia report low levels of crime perception.
Within countries, the NUTS1 regions with the highest proportion of individuals
worried about crime, vandalism or violence are those hosting the country’s capital
such as Ileˆ-de-France (FR1) in France, the Community of Madrid (ES2) in Spain
or Brussels Capital region (BE1) in Belgium.
The bivariate correlations in Figure 20 show that the perceived crime and income
inequality are correlated to each other with correlation coefficient equals to 0.52
when the income inequality index is the Gini coefficient and to 0.49 if instead
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Figure 18: Domestic burglary across NUTS1 regions.
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the S80/S20 ratio is the index used. In quantitative terms, a 0.1 rise in the Gini
coefficient is associated with a 16.9 percentage points increase in the percentage of
individuals reporting that crime, violence or vandalism is a problem. Additionally
an increase of the S80/S20 ratio implies a 6.3 percentage points rise in the value
of the subjective indicator of crime.
3.7 Education and income inequality
3.7.1 Rationale
The high and positive correlation between education and income is a well-
established fact. In the theory of the human capital, Gary Becker (1964) showed
that acquiring education increases the skills and competencies of individuals and
their productivity. Since in a competitive labor market wages equal workers’s
productivity, higher productivity leads to higher wage. This means that a more
educated society holds greater welfare. Supporting as well as opposing views have
encouraged the production of countless empirical and theoretical studies. Nowa-
days, the acknowledgment of a causal relationship between education and earning
is a well-established result and it is one of the most important achievements in
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Figure 19: Self-Perception of Crime across NUTS1 regions.
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economics.
Conversely things are less clear-cut when analyzing the link between income in-
equality and educational attainments.
On the one hand, rising wage inequality should encourage investments in educa-
tion mainly because it raises the return to education. Topel (1997) observes a
faster skill accumulation as a result of rising returns. This increase in the supply
of skills should eventually mitigate the increase in inequality.
On the other hand, increasing income inequality affects also the resources that
households have available to finance education. The intergenerational theory
claims that there exists a strong correlation between income and education distri-
butions. This entails that barriers, e.g. liquidity constraints, family background,
might prevent the investment in education for the fraction of the population be-
longing to the bottom of the income distribution. If the intergenerational mech-
anism is persistent then the same part of population are trapped at low levels of
education and income for more than one generation.
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Figure 20: Bivariate correlations between crime indicators and income in-
equality.
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3.7.2 Bivariate correlations
The relationship between income inequality and educational outcomes is investi-
gated by relying on the two EU2020 headline indicators in education and training.
The first indicator refers to the share of the population aged 30-34 years who have
successfully completed university or university-like (tertiary-level) education with
an education level ISCED of 5-6.26 Data are drawn from the 2009 EU-LFS sur-
vey. Estonia is missing. The second indicator employed here, describes a negative
development in the education sector, namely the share of students which leave
the education system prematurely and with only a low level of education. This
indicator is drawn from the 2009 EU LFS and measures the proportion of persons
aged 18 to 24 whose highest level of education or training attained is ISCED 0,
1, 2 or 3c short and who declared not having received any education or training
in the four weeks preceding the survey.27. Data is available for all countries for
2009 except for the regions in Germany, for which available data comes from
2004-2008.
26 See Eurostat, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=
1&plugin=0&language=en&pcode=t2020_41&tableSelection=1
27See Eurostat, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=
1&plugin=0&language=en&pcode=t2020_40&tableSelection=1
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Figures 21-22 display the regional distribution of the two education indicators in
the EU member states. High shares of the population aged 30-34 with completed
tertiary education can be found in parts of Sweden, Denmark, Ireland, and the
UK, as well as in central France (Ileˆ de France) and northern and central Spain
(ES2, ES3) and Luxembourg. On the other side, very low levels of tertiary
education completion can be found in Portugal, Italy, Czech Republic, parts of
Austria (AT2), Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Romania and Greece. In
addition to the variation of income inequality across European countries, we
also observe substantial within country variation for Spain, UK, Germany and
France. In France, moving from the regions which comprises Paris (FR1) to
the surrounding region (FR2) is accompanied with a drop in tertiary education
completion rates of 17 percentage points (i.e. from 39.27% to 22.10%).
From Figure 22, we observe a huge variation in the share of early school leavers.
For example, some Eastern-European countries perform very well and have only
very low levels of early school leavers, such as for Poland, Lithuania, Czech Re-
public, Slovenia and Slovakia. However, neighboring countries, such as Hungary,
Romania and Greece have comparably very high levels of early school leavers.
In addition, high shares of early school leavers can be found in Spain, Portugal,
Italy, and the UK. In addition, we again observe very high within-country varia-
tions especially for the UK, France, Italy and Germany. For France, early school
leaver rates vary from as low as 9% (FR5) to a maximum of 16.10% (FR8).
After this first glance at the regional distribution of educational achievement over
the EU countries, we now ask the question whether we can detect empirically any
relationship between educational attainment and income inequality. Here, Figure
23 displays the pairwise correlation between the two educational indicators and
income disparity indices. Taken together the results from the pairwise correlations
of the two education indicators provide a mixed picture. On the one hand, the
tertiary education completion rate is not significantly related to income inequality
Both the correlation and regression coefficients are not statistically different from
zero. This lack of correlation is confirmed by the results reported in Appendix.
On the other hand, the share of early school leavers is positively associated with
income inequality. The pairwise correlation amounts to 0.35 if income disparity
is proxied by the gini index and to 0.42 when the S80/S20 ratio is employed.
The robustness checks provided in Appendix Tables A1-A3 confirm the negative
association between income inequality and the share of early school leavers.
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Figure 21: Tertiary Education completion across NUTS1 regions.
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Figure 22: Early School Leavers across NUTS1 regions.
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Figure 23: Bivariate correlations between education indicators and income
inequality.
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4 Conclusion
Findings reported in this document need to be interpreted with caution as they
are based on simple bivariate correlations. In other words, the associations
between income inequality and the socio-outcomes discussed in this document
should not be interpreted as causal relationships.
The present report complements the earlier literature review (D‘Hombres et al.,
2012) and aims to focus our target for a subsequent causality quest.
Based on the finding of the present studies it would seem that the most promising
avenues for a research on the social outcomes of wage inequality should focus on:
• The negative relationship between income inequality and recorded voter
turnout;
• The negative relationship between income inequality and participation in
voluntary organizations;
• The positive correlation between income inequality and crime rates;
• The positive correlation between income inequality and early school leaver
rates.
Results one to four above remain valid, irrespectively of the estimator or the
income disparity index employed.
The following results are less promising in that the findings are found sensitive
to the estimation method or the inequality index used for the computation of the
bivariate statistics:
• The negative relationship between income inequality and reported voter
turnout;
• The negative relationship between income inequality and trust.
Finally, little scope for a causality analysis seems to exist for the social outcomes
related to well-being and health.
Income inequality and social outcomes 55
References
Alesina, A., & La Ferrara, E. (2002). Who trust the others? Journal of Public
Economics, 85(2), 207-234.
Becker, G. S. (1968). Crime and punishment: An economic approach. Journal of
Political Economy, 76, 169-217.
Bo¨heim, Rene´ and Jenkins, Stephen P. (2006). A comparison of current and
annual measures of income in the British Household Panel Survey. Journal of
official statistics, 22 (4). pp. 733-758.
Bourdieu , P. (1977). Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Coleman, J. S. (1990). Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge: Harvard Uni-
versity Press.
Dawkins, Richard (1976). The Selfish Gene. New York City: Oxford University
Press.
Deaton, A. (2003). Health, Inequality, and Economic Development. Journal of
Economic Literature, 41(1), 113-158.
Dee, T.S. (2004), Are there civic returns to education? Journal of Public Eco-
nomics, 88, 1697-1720.
Diamond, Jared (1992). The Third Chimpanzee: The Evolution and Future of
the Human Animal. New York : HarperCollins Publishers.
Eurostat (2010). European Regional and Urban Statistics. Avail-
able at http://www.diba.cat/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=
49e9075a-0ed5-44cd-ae05-469548b1ba54&groupId=172547.
Eurostat. (2010). Income and Living Conditions in Europe. (A. B. Atkinson, &
E. Marlier, Eds.) Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union.
Eurostat. (2012). Glossary:Equivalised disposable income. Retrieved September
11, 2012, from http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/
index.php/Glossary:Equivalised_disposable_income.
European Commission. (2010). Social Mobility and Intra-Regional Income
Distribution Across EU Member States. Retrieved September 11, 2012,
from http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/studies/
pdf/sm_final_report_08072010.pdf.
Income inequality and social outcomes 56
Frick, J. R., Grabka, M. M., Smeeding, T., & Tsakloglou, P. (2008). Distributional
Effects of Imputed Rents in Seven European Countries. EUROMOD (AIM-AP)
D1.1.
D‘Hombres B, Weber A, Elia L. (2012). Literature review on income inequality
and the effects on social outcomes, European Commission Joint Research Centre,
EUR N. pending
Horn, D. (2011). Income Inequality and Voter Turnout. Gini Working Paper,
http://www.Gini-research.org/discussion_papers?layout=front_end.
Guiso, L., Sapienza, P., & Zingales, L. (2010). ”Civic Capital as the Missing
Link,” NBER Working Papers 15845, National Bureau of Economic Research,
Inc.
Guiso, L., Sapienza, P., & Zingales, L. (2008). ”Social Capital as Good Culture,”
CEPR Discussion Papers 6657, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Knack, S., & Keefer, P. (1997). Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A
Cross-Country Investigation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(4), 1251-
1588.
Leigh, A., Jencks, C., & Smeeding, T. M. (2009). Health and Economic Inequality.
In W. Salverda, B. Nolan, & T. Smeeding, The Oxford Handbook of Economic
Inequality (pp. 384-405). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lijphart, A. (1997). Unequal Participation: Democracy’s Unresovled Dilemma.
American Political Science Review, 91, 1-14.
Malher, V. (2002). Exploring the subnational dimension of income inequality:
an analysis of the relationship between inequality and electoral turnout in the
developed countries. Available at http://www.lisproject.org/publications/
liswps/292.pdf.
Meltzer, A., & Scott, R. (1981). A rational theory of the size of government.
Journal of Political Economy, 89, 914-927.
Meltzer, A., & Scott, R. (1981). A rational theory of the size of government.
Journal of Political Economy, 89, 914-927.
Morgan, K. (2000). Inequality and crime. The Review of Economics and Statistics,
82, 530-539.
Milligan, K., Moretti, E., Oreopoulus, P. (2003), Does education improve citi-
zenship? Evidence from the U.S. and the U.K. Journal of Public Economics, 88,
1667-1695.
Income inequality and social outcomes 57
Mueller, D. C., & Stratmann, T. (2003). The Economic Effects of Democratic
Participation. Journal of Public Economics, 87(9-10), 2129-2155.
OECD. (2011). Divided We Stand: Why Inequality Keeps Rising. OECD
Publishing. Retrieved January 18, 2012, from http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/
9789264119536-en.
Putnam RD, R. D., Leonardi , R., & Nanenetti, R. (1993). Making Democracy
Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
Rothstein , B., & Uslaner , E. (2005). All for all: equality and social trust. LSE
Health and Social Care Discussion Paper Number 15.
Sen, A. (2002). Health: Perception versus Observation. BMJ(2002), 324, 860-861
Siedler, T. (2007). Schooling and citizenship: evidence from compulsory schooling
reforms. IZA Discussion Papers 2573, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
Stiglitz, Joseph (2012). the Price of Inequality: How Todays Divided Society
Endangers Our Future, New York: W.W. Norton, 2012.
Solt, F. (2010). Does Economic Inequality Depress Electoral Participation? Test-
ing the Schattschneider Hypothesis. Political Behavior, 32(2), 285-301.
Uslaner, E. M., & Brown, M. (2005). Inequality, Trust, and Civic Engagement.
American Politics Research, 33, 868-854.
Van Kerm, Philippe, (2007). Extreme incomes and the estimation of poverty and
inequality indicators from EU-SILC. IRISS Working Paper Series 2007-01, IRISS
at CEPS/INSTEAD.
Income inequality and social outcomes 58
Appendix
Income inequality and social outcomes 59
T
a
b
le
A
.1
:
S
o
c
ia
l
o
u
tc
o
m
e
s
a
n
d
G
in
i
c
o
e
ffi
c
ie
n
t:
so
m
e
ro
b
u
st
e
n
e
ss
ch
e
ck
s.
H
a
p
p
in
es
s
L
if
e
S
a
t-
is
fa
ct
io
n
C
ri
m
e
B
u
rg
la
ry
H
ea
lt
h
S
ta
tu
s
C
h
ro
n
ic
D
is
ea
se
M
em
be
rs
h
ip
T
ru
st
T
er
ti
a
ry
E
d
u
ca
-
ti
o
n
E
a
rl
y
S
ch
oo
l
L
ea
ve
rs
V
o
ti
n
g
B
e-
h
a
vi
o
u
r
R
ec
o
rd
ed
T
u
rn
o
u
t
O
L
S
e
st
im
a
te
s
G
in
i
-0
.2
7
4
-3
.3
5
2
1
.6
9
4
1
9
.7
8
1
0
.4
2
0
-0
.1
0
3
-0
.6
7
7
-2
.9
1
6
1
4
.4
5
4
5
8
.6
6
0
-0
.6
3
7
-1
1
5
.9
0
(0
.5
2
)
(-
1
.8
7
)
(5
.5
8
)
(3
.0
5
)
(0
.7
7
)
(-
0
.7
1
)
(-
2
.0
7
)
(-
1
.6
4
)
(0
.7
3
)
(3
.5
2
)
(-
3
.7
3
)
(-
4
.1
0
)
O
b
s
90
84
87
81
91
87
90
84
89
92
84
78
O
L
S
e
st
im
a
te
s
-
w
in
so
ri
z
e
d
in
c
o
m
e
G
in
i
1
.5
5
5
-0
.8
5
2
0
.8
9
8
2
0
.0
4
1
0
.1
5
2
-0
.0
9
1
-1
.2
3
1
2
.7
3
9
4
.7
4
8
5
1
.5
7
3
-0
.4
6
9
-9
9
.3
2
6
(2
.0
8
)
(-
0
.3
3
)
(2
.3
2
)
(2
.4
5
)
(0
.1
9
)
(-
0
.4
2
)
(-
3
.2
1
)
(1
.0
8
)
(0
.1
6
)
(3
.2
6
)
(-
2
.1
9
)
(-
2
.8
8
)
O
b
s
90
84
87
81
91
87
90
84
89
92
84
78
L
A
V
-
w
in
so
ri
z
e
d
in
c
o
m
e
G
in
i
-1
.5
5
5
-0
.8
5
2
0
.8
9
8
2
0
.0
4
1
0
.1
5
2
-0
.0
9
1
-1
.2
3
1
2
.7
3
9
4
.7
4
8
5
1
.5
7
3
-0
.4
6
9
-1
0
1
.0
3
6
(-
2
.3
5
)
(-
0
.4
3
)
(3
.8
0
)
(2
.8
7
)
(0
.1
5
)
(-
0
.4
8
)
(-
3
.4
7
)
(0
.9
1
)
(0
.1
9
)
(3
.0
2
)
(-
1
.8
3
)
(-
2
.4
4
)
O
b
s
90
84
87
81
91
87
90
84
89
92
84
77
S
o
u
rc
e:
A
u
th
o
rs
’
ca
lc
u
la
ti
o
n
s.
t-
st
a
t
(i
n
b
ra
ck
et
s)
.
Income inequality and social outcomes 60
T
a
b
le
A
.2
:
S
o
c
ia
l
O
u
tc
o
m
e
s
a
n
d
S
8
0
/
S
2
0
ra
ti
o
:
so
m
e
ro
b
u
st
n
e
ss
ch
e
ck
s.
H
a
p
p
in
es
s
L
if
e
S
a
t-
is
fa
ct
io
n
C
ri
m
e
B
u
rg
la
ry
H
ea
lt
h
S
ta
tu
s
C
h
ro
n
ic
D
is
ea
se
M
em
be
rs
h
ip
T
ru
st
T
er
ti
a
ry
E
d
u
ca
-
ti
o
n
E
a
rl
y
S
ch
oo
l
L
ea
ve
rs
V
o
ti
n
g
B
e-
h
a
vi
o
u
r
R
ec
o
rd
ed
T
u
rn
o
u
t
O
L
S
e
st
im
a
te
s
R
a
ti
o
S
8
0
S
2
0
-0
.0
2
1
-0
.1
0
5
0
.0
6
3
0
.6
4
8
0
.0
1
8
-0
.0
0
6
-0
.0
3
1
-0
.1
0
8
0
.1
6
1
2
.4
8
5
-0
.0
2
1
-4
.5
9
0
(-
1
.0
9
)
(-
1
.6
6
)
(5
.2
2
)
(2
.5
6
)
(0
.9
1
)
(-
1
.2
7
)
(-
2
.5
7
)
(-
1
.7
2
)
(0
.2
3
)
(4
.3
9
)
(-
3
.4
7
)
(-
4
.5
7
)
O
b
s
90
84
8
7
81
91
87
90
8
4
89
92
84
78
O
L
S
e
st
im
a
te
s
-
w
in
so
ri
z
e
d
in
c
o
m
e
R
a
ti
o
S
8
0
S
2
0
-0
.0
2
4
-0
.1
3
6
0
.0
6
3
0
.6
5
9
0
.0
2
4
-0
.0
0
6
-0
.0
3
2
-0
.1
2
7
0
.0
4
0
2
.3
1
4
-0
.0
2
4
-5
.0
5
3
(-
1
.2
5
)
(-
2
.0
6
)
(5
.2
2
)
(2
.5
6
)
(1
.1
6
)
(-
1
.1
2
)
(-
2
.6
1
)
(-
1
.9
5
)
(0
.0
6
)
(3
.8
4
)
(-
3
.8
2
)
(-
4
.9
8
)
O
b
s
90
84
8
7
81
91
87
90
8
4
89
92
84
78
L
A
V
-
w
in
so
ri
z
e
d
in
c
o
m
e
R
a
ti
o
S
8
0
S
2
0
-0
.0
8
7
-0
.0
3
8
0
.0
4
0
0
.8
2
7
0
.0
0
6
-0
.0
0
6
-0
.0
3
7
0
.0
7
7
-0
.1
7
0
1
.9
9
3
-0
.0
1
4
-5
.0
2
1
(-
3
.8
8
)
(-
0
.5
2
)
(4
.8
3
)
(2
.6
2
)
(0
.1
8
)
(-
0
.7
6
)
(-
2
.9
1
)
(0
.6
4
)
(-
0
.1
8
)
(3
.9
6
)
(-
1
.4
8
)
(-
3
.6
5
)
O
b
s
90
84
8
7
81
91
87
90
8
4
89
92
84
77
S
o
u
rc
e:
A
u
th
o
rs
’
ca
lc
u
la
ti
o
n
s.
t-
st
a
t
(i
n
b
ra
ck
et
s)
.
Income inequality and social outcomes 61
T
a
b
le
A
.3
:
S
o
c
ia
l
O
u
tc
o
m
e
s
a
n
d
th
e
A
tk
in
so
n
in
d
e
x
,

=
0.
5:
so
m
e
ro
b
u
st
n
e
ss
ch
e
ck
s.
H
a
p
p
in
es
s
L
if
e
S
a
t-
is
fa
ct
io
n
C
ri
m
e
B
u
rg
la
ry
H
ea
lt
h
S
ta
tu
s
C
h
ro
n
ic
D
is
ea
se
M
em
be
rs
h
ip
T
ru
st
T
er
ti
a
ry
E
d
u
ca
-
ti
o
n
E
a
rl
y
S
ch
oo
l
L
ea
ve
rs
V
o
ti
n
g
B
e-
h
a
vi
o
u
r
R
ec
o
rd
ed
T
u
rn
o
u
t
O
L
S
e
st
im
a
te
s
A
tk
in
so
n

=
0.
5
-0
.4
5
0
-6
.3
4
1
3
.4
1
2
4
1
.2
0
1
0
.5
4
1
-0
.1
1
3
-1
.0
2
8
-4
.5
8
8
3
4
.7
0
3
8
9
.0
8
2
-1
.1
8
9
-2
1
4
.8
6
5
(-
0
.4
4
)
(-
1
.8
0
)
(5
.7
6
)
(3
.3
1
)
(0
.5
1
)
(-
0
.4
4
)
(-
1
.6
0
)
(-
1
.3
1
)
(0
.9
1
)
(2
.6
7
)
(-
3
.5
3
)
(-
3
.8
5
)
O
b
s
90
84
8
7
81
91
87
90
8
4
89
92
84
78
O
L
S
e
st
im
a
te
s
-
w
in
so
ri
z
e
d
in
c
o
m
e
A
tk
in
so
n

=
0.
5
-1
.6
6
0
-0
.9
0
3
1
.0
6
0
2
1
.6
5
8
0
.1
8
0
-0
.1
7
3
-1
.1
7
3
2
.5
7
8
4
.4
7
9
6
0
.5
5
1
-0
.3
7
6
-1
3
8
.0
6
5
(-
1
.8
2
)
(-
0
.4
4
)
(4
.4
1
)
(2
.6
0
)
(0
.1
7
)
(-
0
.8
4
)
(-
2
.7
8
)
(0
.7
7
)
(0
.1
6
)
(3
.2
1
)
(-
1
.2
6
)
(-
3
.2
2
)
O
b
s
90
84
8
7
81
91
87
90
8
4
89
92
84
78
L
A
V
e
st
im
a
te
s
-
w
in
so
ri
z
e
d
in
c
o
m
e
A
tk
in
so
n

=
0.
5
-2
.8
3
9
-1
.5
8
1
2
.1
4
6
4
5
.6
5
3
0
.1
3
6
-0
.1
2
0
-2
.2
9
4
4
.0
6
5
5
8
.7
7
8
9
9
.5
8
4
-0
.7
3
2
-2
0
6
.6
5
5
(-
1
.9
7
)
(-
0
.4
1
)
(5
.8
5
)
(3
.5
9
)
(0
.0
7
)
(-
0
.3
7
)
(-
3
.4
4
)
(0
.6
7
)
(1
.4
3
)
(3
.0
9
)
(-
1
.5
1
)
(-
2
.5
7
)
O
b
s
90
8
4
87
81
91
87
90
84
89
92
84
77
S
o
u
rc
e:
A
u
th
o
rs
’
ca
lc
u
la
ti
o
n
s.
t-
st
a
t
(i
n
b
ra
ck
et
s)
.
Income inequality and social outcomes 62
T
a
b
le
A
.4
:
S
o
c
ia
l
O
u
tc
o
m
e
s
a
n
d
th
e
A
tk
in
so
n
in
d
e
x
,

=
1:
so
m
e
ro
b
u
st
n
e
ss
ch
e
ck
s.
H
a
p
p
in
es
s
L
if
e
S
a
t-
is
fa
ct
io
n
C
ri
m
e
B
u
rg
la
ry
H
ea
lt
h
S
ta
tu
s
C
h
ro
n
ic
D
is
ea
se
M
em
be
rs
h
ip
T
ru
st
T
er
ti
a
ry
E
d
u
ca
-
ti
o
n
E
a
rl
y
S
ch
oo
l
L
ea
ve
rs
V
o
ti
n
g
B
e-
h
a
vi
o
u
r
R
ec
o
rd
ed
T
u
rn
o
u
t
O
L
S
e
st
im
a
te
s
A
tk
in
so
n

=
1
-0
.5
5
1
-3
.4
7
2
1
.8
4
0
2
0
.5
4
6
0
.5
6
7
-0
.1
4
0
-0
.8
2
5
-3
.0
3
9
8
.0
1
9
6
8
.8
3
6
-0
.6
8
6
-1
3
9
.6
6
8
(-
0
.9
5
)
(-
1
.7
6
)
(5
.2
2
)
(2
.7
9
)
(0
.9
4
)
(-
0
.8
7
)
(-
2
.2
9
)
(-
1
.5
6
)
(0
.3
7
)
(3
.7
7
)
(-
3
.6
5
)
(-
4
.4
6
)
O
b
s
90
84
87
81
91
87
90
84
89
92
84
78
O
L
S
e
st
im
a
te
s
-
w
in
so
ri
z
e
d
in
c
o
m
e
A
tk
in
so
n

=
1
-2
.6
5
8
-1
.5
1
6
2
.0
9
7
4
7
.3
6
0
0
.1
5
7
-0
.2
0
6
-2
.0
0
2
4
.0
8
6
5
8
.7
6
5
1
0
3
.5
6
0
-0
.7
3
3
-2
0
0
.0
7
3
(-
1
.7
2
)
(-
0
.4
0
)
(5
.1
9
)
(3
.7
8
)
(0
.0
8
)
(-
0
.6
4
)
(-
2
.7
4
)
(0
.6
8
)
(1
.3
0
)
(3
.0
4
)
(-
1
.5
0
)
(-
2
.9
0
)
O
b
s
90
84
87
81
91
87
90
84
89
92
84
78
L
A
V
e
st
im
a
te
s
-
w
in
so
ri
z
e
d
in
c
o
m
e
A
tk
in
so
n

=
1
-2
.5
0
2
-0
.9
2
9
1
.1
2
0
2
2
.0
6
0
0
.1
5
9
-0
.1
1
7
-1
.1
6
6
2
.5
7
0
4
.5
2
2
6
0
.4
6
8
-0
.4
6
7
-1
3
6
.9
9
3
(-
3
.6
1
)
(-
0
.4
5
)
(4
.5
3
)
(2
.7
9
)
(0
.1
5
)
(-
0
.5
5
)
(-
2
.8
8
)
(0
.7
6
)
(0
.1
6
)
(3
.3
4
)
(-
1
.5
9
)
(-
3
.1
6
)
O
b
s
90
84
87
81
91
87
90
84
89
92
84
77
S
o
u
rc
e:
A
u
th
o
rs
’
ca
lc
u
la
ti
o
n
s.
t-
st
a
t
(i
n
b
ra
ck
et
s)
.
Income inequality and social outcomes 63
Table A.5: Full name of NUTS 1 regions.
Acronym Full name
Austria AT1 East Austria
” AT2 Southern Austria
” AT3 West Austria
Belgium BE1 Brussels Capital Region
” BE2 Flemish Region
” BE3 Walloon region
Bulgaria BG3 Severna I Iztochna
” BG4 Yugozapadna I Yuzhna
Tsentralna
Cyprus CY0 Cyprus
Czech Republic CZ0 Czech Republic
Germany DE1 Baden-Wu¨rttemberg
” DE2 Bavaria
” DE3 Berlin
” DE4 Brandenburg
” DE5 Bremen
” DE6 Hamburg
” DE7 Hessen
” DE8 Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern
” DE9 Lower Saxony
” DEA North Rhine-Westphalia
” DEB Rhineland-Palatinate
” DEC Saarland
” DED Saxony
” DEE Saxony-Anhalt
” DEF Schleswig-Holstein
” DEG Thuringia
Denmark DK0 Denmark
Estonia EE0 Estonia
Spain ES1 North West
” ES2 North East
” ES3 Community of Madrid
” ES4 Centre
” ES5 East
” ES6 South
” ES7 Canary Islands
Finland FI1 Mainland Finland
” FI2 Aland
France FR1 Iˆle-de-France
” FR2 Parisian basin
” FR3 Nord-Pas-de-Calais
” FR4 East
” FR5 West
” FR6 South West
” FR7 Centre East
” FR8 Mediterranean
” FR9 Overseas departments
Greece GR1 Voreia Ellada
” GR2 Kentriki Ellada
” GR3 Attica
” GR4 Nisia Aigaiou, Kriti
Hungary HU1 Central Hungary
” HU2 Transdanubia
” HU3 Great Plain and North
Continued on next page
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Acronym Full name
Ireland IE0 Ireland
Iceland IS0 Iceland
Italy ITC North West
” ITD North East
” ITE Centre
” ITF South
” ITG Islands
Lithuania LT0 Lithuania
Luxembourg LU0 Luxembourg
Latvia LV0 Latvia
Netherland NL1 North Netherlands
” NL2 East Netherlands
” NL3 West Netherlands
” NL4 South Netherlands
Norway NO0 Norway
Poland PL1 Central Region
” PL2 South Region
” PL3 East Region
” PL4 Northwest Region
” PL5 Southwest Region
” PL6 North Region
Portugal PT1 Mainland Portugal
” PT2 Azores
” PT3 Madeira
Romania RO1 One
” RO2 Two
” RO3 Three
” RO4 Four
Sweden SE1 East Sweden
” SE2 South Sweden
” SE3 North Sweden
Slovenia SI0 Slovenia
Slovakia SK0 Slovakia
United Kingdom UKC North East England
” UKD North West England
” UKE Yorkshire and the
Humber
” UKF East Midlands
” UKG West Midlands
” UKH East of England
” UKI Greater London
” UKJ South East England
” UKK South West England
” UKL Wales
” UKM Scotland
” UKN Northern Ireland
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